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FRIENDLY t

I assume I was asked to join these discussions because fourteen
years ago, when I delivered at Dartmouth College the annual
lecture on the Holmes devise, I took as my title "The Dartmouth
College Case and the Public-Private Penumbra." 1 I wonder how
the organizers of this symposium ever came to know about that
lecture. It was printed by the University of Texas in a handsome,
slender, green volume-the green, incidentally, having no relation
to Dartmouth-which is almost unobtainable; later Holmes lecturers
have had the good sense to insist on publication in the law review
of the school where the lecture was delivered. That leads to the
next wonderment. Why was a lecture on law delivered at a "college" 2 which has no law school? The answer, if you can call it
one, is that Dartmouth sought the Holmes lecture in 1968 because
that was the 150th anniversary of Daniel Webster's argument of
the Dartmouth College Case.3 Finally, what on earth did the
Dartmouth College Case have to do with the public/private distinction? In accepting the invitation to lecture at Dartmouth, I
f Senior Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; Presiding Judge, Special Court under the Regional Rail Reorganization Act. A.B. 1923,
LL.B. 1927, Harvard University.
I H. FmmENDLY, Tim DAsTMOrrs COLLEGE CASE AND THE POBLIC-PBaVATE
(1968).
2
Dartmouth ceased long ago to be a "small college" and became a large university. Presumably it would proudly claim that title if it were anything but
Dartmouth. However, the whole point of the Dartmouth College Case was the
successful resistance to an act that would have replaced the Trustees of Dartmouth
College with the Trustees of Dartmouth University. Hence I suppose Dartmouth
will remain a "college' to the end of time.
NImiBvRA

3

Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
(1289)
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had made clear that I would not feel bound to discuss the Dartmouth College Case; this was nearly a decade before the rekindling
of interest in the contracts clause as a result of United States Trust
Co. v. New Jersey.4 My reservation led to a visit from President
Dickey of Dartmouth. Couldn't I find some way to insinuate the
Dartmouth College Case into whatever subject I chose? I promised
I would at least reread the opinion, and there it was: Dartmouth,
Chief Justice Marshall explained, was not like a municipal corporation, the charter of which the legislature could amend at will.
In language that has a contemporary ring, Dartmouth and similar
institutions "do not fill the place, which would otherwise be occupied by government, but that which would otherwise remain
vacant. They are complete acquisitions to literature." 5 To the
question, "[a]re the trustees and professors public officers, invested
with any portion of political power, partaking in any degree in the
administration of civil government, and performing duties which
flow from the sovereign authority?",6 Marshall responded with a
resounding "No." Here is the "public function" doctrine of today,7 although developed in the context of the contracts clause
rather than of "state action."
When I spoke at Dartmouth, Professor Charles Black had
written only recently that the state action cases were "a conceptual
disaster area." 8 His statement would appear even more apt today.
Although we now have a dozen more Supreme Court decisions, 9
4431 U.S. 1 (1977).
5 17 U.s. (4 Wheat.) at 647.

Chief Justice Marshall overstated the extent to

which the funding of Dartmouth was purely private. The jury had found that, in addition to the receipt of private contributions, Dartmouth had been endowed by New

Hampshire and Vermont with lands "of great value."

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 538.

Also he was surely wrong in predicting that, absent private benefactors, higher

education would remain "vacant," as the great public universities of the middle
and far west were to prove within a few decades. President Conant of Harvard,
who happened to be in Hanover on the day of my lecture, believed that the impetus
to private benefactors afforded by the Dartmouth College Case did postpone the
development of public universities in the northeast until recent times.
6Id. 634.
7The phrase is said to have originated in Justice Black's opinion in Marsh v.

Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946), see L. TamE, AMmuCAN CONSTrruTiONAL
LAW 1165 (1978), although Professor Tribe does not consider Marsh to have been
"a true 'public function' decision." Id.
8Black, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term-Foreword: "State Action," Equal
Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 Htnv. L. REv. 69, 95 (1967).

9The most notable are Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (distinguisbing-or at least attempting to distinguish-Noith Ga. Finishing, Inc. v.
Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600
(1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); and Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp.,
395 U.S. 337 (1969)); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (overruling
Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968));
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which seem less ready to find state action than did those of earlier
years, most of the opinions have been perfunctory and conclusory.
If we now know more about the location of the border between
public and private action, this is rather because the Court has
pricked out more reference points than because it has elaborated
any satisfying theory. Perhaps, as Professor Brest will suggest, no
one can. Largely we still must navigate with the aid of the wavering beacon furnished by Justice Clark's statement in Burton v.
Wilmington ParkingAuthority 10: "Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in
private conduct be attributed its true significance." 11
I must confess that I have not kept up with the stream of state
action decisions by the lower federal courts since my Dartmouth
lecture. 1 2 Many of these have presented problems I had posed
there as hypotheticals.' 3 Still less have I kept abreast of the ballooning literature. There are only two points, both at least suggested
in my lecture, 14 that I would like to mention briefly.
One is that more state involvement will be required to produce a holding of unconstitutionality when the constitutional claim
is lack of procedural due process, or even infringement of asserted
first amendment rights, than when the claim is of racial discrimination. Surely the result in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.15
would have been different if the company had refused to serve
blacks.16
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Moose Lodge No. 107
v. Irvis, 407' U.S. 163 (1972); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972); Evans
v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
10 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
11 Id. 722. This was preceded by a statement that "to fashion and apply a
precise formula for recognition of state responsibility under the Equal Protection
Clause is an 'impossible task' which 'This Court has never attempted."' Id.,
quoting Kotch v. Board of River Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 556 (1947), certainly
one of2 the blindest decisions in the state action field.
1 A useful collection of the cases, along with searching questions about them,
can be found in W. LocuHAnT, Y. KAinsAR & J. CHOPER, CONSvTrrO NAL LAw;
CAsEs-CoMMnmrrs--Qu snoNs 1511-73 (5th ed. 1980).
13I became an early victim in Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968), and
unsurprisingly followed my own preachings. Other state action cases in which I
have written are Coleman v. Wagner College, 429 F.2d 1120, 1126-27 (2d Cir.
1970) (concurring opinion); Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School, 478 F.2d 1137 (2d
Cir. 1973); Wahba v. New York Univ., 492 F.2d 96 -(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 874 (1974); and Jackson v. Statler Found., 496 F.2d 623, 636-41 (2d Cir.
1974) (dissenting from denial, by an equally divided court, of reconsideration en
banc), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975).
14 See H. FmmLy, supra note 1, at 16-18, 23.
15 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
36 Generally such a refusal would have violated state laws against discrimination by public utilities and the federal constitutional issue would not have had to
be reached.
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This differentiation seems to me to be entirely justified. In
the Wilmington ParkingAuthority case it was degrading that black
citizens should- not be allowed to eat in a restaurant in a public
building. Justice Clark was quite right in emphasizing that the
Authority "flew from mastheads on the roof both the state and
national flags.'.' 17 The equal protection clause does not allow a
state or a city to institutionalize Jim Crow. The state's failure to
have taken the easy step needed to insure that the Eagle Coffee
Shoppe would -be open to black citizens was properly viewed as
sufficient state action to trigger the equal protection clause. Again,
8 revised
whatever the true explanation of Shelley v. Kraemer,1
opinions for which -have been written by two professors then or
later.connected with this law school and published in its law review,' 9 most people would say of it, as Paul Freund is reputed to
have said of Brown. v. Board of Education,20 "can you imagine it
having been decided the other way?" Even in this most sensitive
area, however, not every state contact should suffice to bring down
the constitutional axe. I would go along with Moose Lodge No.
107 v. Irvis,21 although Professor Tribe may be right in saying that
a denial not of
the proper ground for decision would have been
22
state action but of unconstitutional state action.
In my Dartmouth lecture I skipped very lightly over the nowengrossing subject of tax exemption, saying in a footnote: "It has
been assumed, although without much explication, that tax exemption creates no special constitutional problem." 23 That statement
would hardly be made today. What I did discuss was the constitutionality of a state's tolerating discriminatory action by a founder
or donor, 24 as, to take an example particularly appropriate here in

Philadelphia, in the Girard College cases, where the Supreme Court,
with splendid impartiality, refused to review both a decision of the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania that the substitution of private
trustees cured any defect in Stephen Girard's original disposition
17365 U.S. at 720.

18 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
19 See Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA.

L. REv. 473 (1962); Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply
to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1959).
203 47

U.S. 483 (1954).

407 US. 163 (1972).
22
L. TRmE, supra note 7, at 1172-74.
One wonders how the case would have been decided if the plaintiff had been
a nondiscriminatory lodge alleging that it had been unable to obtain a liquor license.
28 H. FRIENDLY, supra note 1, at 19 n.66.
24
See id. 18-24.
21
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and the Third Circuit's later decision that it did not25 I also discussed the constitutionality of the making of government grants to
institutions practicing some form of discrimination. 6 So far as
concerns the more blatant forms of racial discrimination, such as
the case of an institution welcoming all comers except blacks, the
effect of tax exemption now is of only academic interest in light of
Runyon v. McCrary2 7 which held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 did not
require a showing of state action.28 1 However, a good many questions remain. The Runyon Court noted that the case did not
"present any question of the right of a private school to limit its
student body to boys, girls, or to adherents of a particular religious

faith" or "even present the application of § 1981 to private sectarian
schools that practice racial exclusion on religious grounds." 29 The
Court did not mention limitations to a particular ethnic group but
I should suppose that too would not fall within § 1981. It would
also seem very hard to read that section as applying to alleged racial
discrimination in the making of grants to foundations.
There is thus still a substantial area in which tax benefits may
be important. I have read of a case in Massachusetts where a
nearby township is challenging the property tax exemption of Smith
College because it discriminates against men.30 When the suit is
against the grantor of the exemption, it is indeed hard to say there
is no state action; however, one should not leap to the conclusion
that the action is unconstitutional. 31 Even less should courts adopt
the conclusion that receipt of tax benefits subjects the recipient to
the same rigorous standards as the state itself. Here we encounter
32
the positive values of private choice.
2

5 In re Girard College Trusteeship, 391 Pa. 434, 138 A.2d 844, appeal dismissed
and cert. denied, 357 U.S. 570 (1958); Pennsylvania v. Brown, 392 F.2d 120 (3d
Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 921 (1968). See also Pennsylvania v.
Board
of Directors of City Trusts (Girard Will Case), 353 U.S. 230 (1957).
2
6 See H. FmENDLY, supra note 1, at 24-29.

.27427 U.S. 160 (1976).
28 This result was thought to be an ineluctable consequence of Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), which made a similar holding with respect to
42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976)-a construction of that statute which, as said by Justice
Stevens in Runyon, 427 U.S. at 189 (concurring opinion), "would have amazed the
legislators who voted for it." See C. FAsunv,
BEcONsTnUcToN AND PEUNION,
1864-88 (VI HIsTORY oF TnE SuPnEmvE CouRT OF Tm

UmTm

STATES)
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(1971).
29427 U.S. at 167 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
3
0 The action was later dismissed for want of standing. Trustees of Smith
College v. Board of Assessors, 385 Mass. 767, 434 N.E.2d 182 (1982) (affirming
decision of Appellate Tax Board).
31 See L. TAmE, supra note 7, at 1148 n.7.
32
See H. FRmIEDLY, supra note 1, at 29-31, and my opinion dissenting from
the denial of reconsideration en bane in Jackson v. The Statler Found., 496 F.2d
at 636-41.
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In contrast to the racial discrimination against customers at
issue in the Wilmington Parking Authority case, an assertion by
employees of the Eagle Coffee Shoppe that they were entitled to
the same procedural due process with respect to discipline and discharge as must be accorded to some public employees seems, even
on mere statement, to rest differently. Why should the state be
any more bound to guarantee due process to persons working for
private employers who have leased state-owned property than to
private workers generally? I can see no sufficient reason, and I am
not aware that any has been asserted.
The other question, on which I have come to learn rather than
to teach, is whether the state action requirement demands some
identifiable action or is satisfied by a showing that the state's whole
body of law works an unconstitutional denial or deprivation. You
will receive much instruction on this from Professor Brest's critique
of Flagg Brothers v. Brooks - and the discussion it will elicit. We
now have it on the authority of a majority of the Supreme Court,
speaking through Justice Rehnquist in a footnote, that
[i]t would intolerably broaden, beyond the scope of any of
our previous cases, the notion of state action under the
Fourteenth Amendment to hold that the mere existence of
a body of property law in a State, whether decisional or
statutory, itself amounted to "state action" even though no
state process or state officials were ever involved in enforc4
ing that body of law.
Something in this is deeply appealing to the judicial mind. One
feels intuitively that a plaintiff must show the state to have done
something tangible, however little, before a federal court must
confront the task of evaluating his constitutional claim. Most of
the Supreme Court's cases have proceeded on that assumption. Yet
I wonder whether the ghost has in fact been, or ever can be, laid
to rest.
Its lineage can be traced back to the century-old language in
the Civil Rights Cases 3 where Justice Bradley condemned the
federal Civil Rights Act in part because "[i]t applies equally to
cases arising in States which have the justest laws respecting the
personal rights of citizens, and whose authorities are ever ready to
enforce such laws, as to those which arise in States that may have
33

436 U.S. 149 (1978).

341d.160 n.10.
35 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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violated the prohibition of the amendment." 36 In the Wilmington
Parking Authority case the trouble was not in what the Parking
Authority had done, namely, making a perfectly ordinary lease, but
in not inserting an antidiscrimination clause. Justice Stevens'
powerful dissent in Flagg Brothers deserved a better answer than it
received, mostly in footnotes. Justice Rehnquist did not vouchsafe,
save in a cryptic footnote reference,"7 his explanation of Shelley v.
Kraemer; I find it hard to accept the notion that the decision hung
simply on the entry by a state judge of a judgment the judge was
bound to render under state law.38 Somehow I cannot escape the
conclusion that it was Missouri's maintenance of a rule of common
law permitting the enforcement of racially restrictive covenants,
not the action of its courts in enforcing that rule, that was the unconstitutional state action in Shelley. One must regret that the
Court did not hold Flagg Brothers over to the next term for a more
fully developed dialogue rather than dispatch it in the May rush.
On the other hand, advocates of the position that almost everything represents state action, although not necessarily unconstitutional state action, have an obligation to complete the sentence.
They seem to agree that when the state has acted in only a minor
way, as in Moose Lodge, the state may tolerate private conduct that
would be forbidden to the state itself. If the standard thus is lower,
how much lower? Those who consider it sufficient for a holding of
state action that the state could have prevented the allegedly unconstitutional conduct should not be allowed the comfort of belief
that once they have established this proposition, they are home
free; they must tell us how the case should be decided.
The Law Review is to be congratulated for having assembled
such an array of speakers and the speakers for the brilliant papers
they have written. Thank you for inviting me to participate in
this discussion of a problem which is as fascinating as it seems to
be intractable.
36 Id. 14.
37

38

436 U.S. at 160 n.10.

See H. FnmINLY, supra note 1, at 14-15, 16-17; Henkin, supra note 19; L.
TamE, supra note 7, at 1156.

